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Abstract:  The development of renewable and sustainable energy is advanced by public 
financial support. Particularly so in the German Energiewende, which seeks to 
replace nuclear and fossil electricity generation with wind, sun, and biomass. We 
study the impact of the (changes in the) feed-in tariff policy on the investment in 
wind electricity generation capacity in Germany in the period 2000-2014. We 
estimate a generic investment model which includes this support mechanism, the 
cost of capital, investment risks like wind and price volatility, and manufacturing 
costs. We discuss specific features for different types of wind energy investors, 
such as the incumbents, small private investors, diversified companies, and 
independent power producers. We find that a change in the feed-in tariff has a 
negative impact on investment capacity regarding the generation of wind energy: 
a one monetary unit increase in the variation of the tariff is to be associated with a 
decrease by 0.17 MW wind capacity installed. We argue it is policy uncertainty 
that makes investors shy away from making real investments. We also argue that 
the drivers for wind energy investment can differ along different types of firms. 
For the traditional power producers, especially electricity price volatility, 
construction costs, and carbon prices seem to matter. But for the other investor 
types, the feed-in tariff is crucial indeed. 
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Introduction 
 
Massive public financial support is provided for energy production and consumption. With 
renewable energy, this mainly comes via production or producer subsidies. In this respect, the 
treatment of German wind energy installations has led to intense academic and political 
debate (von Hirschhausen, 2014). In this paper, we investigate how German firms account for 
public policy support via the feed-in tariff for wind energy next to other investment decision 
factors.  
The main arguments for public financial support of wind energy projects are related 
to two types of market imperfections, which may both lead to underinvestment in wind 
projects: spillovers or incomplete appropriation and financial constraints (Nelson, 1959; 
Arrow, 1962). Firstly, due to the (marketable) public-good nature of wind energy production 
(Wolsink, 2007), the benefits of spillover to other households are only partially appropriated 
by innovators (see Groba and Breitschopf, 2013). Then, private returns from wind energy 
investment are probably smaller than their social returns. As a consequence, firms may invest 
less in wind energy than would be desirable from a social welfare perspective. Secondly, the 
entrepreneur typically has superior information about the nature and economic potential of the 
investment project compared to financiers and other stakeholders. This asymmetry may be 
amplified if firms do not disseminate the experience with their projects. As a consequence, the 
cost of external funds to finance wind energy may be higher than the cost of financing more 
conventional investments (Akerlof, 1970). Especially with relatively new technologies, this 
effect will be exacerbated as the financiers will be hesitant about financing innovate projects 
(Hall and Lerner, 2010). 
 
From January 2000 until March 2014 German wind capacity rose from 4,500 
megawatt to 34,300 megawatt (MW). In 2000, wind energy sources had an overall share of 
1.6 per cent, which rose to 8.2 percent in 2012 (AGEE-Stat, 2013). In 2012, about half of all 
German renewable energy producing plants (46%) was owned by small-scale individual 
investors, including farmers and cooperatively owned wind parks. Medium sized enterprises, 
funds and banking institutions, and project developers, which specialize in the investment and 
operation of renewable energy plants, owned about one seventh each, while the four main 
electricity producers together owned a share of 5 per cent (Klaus Novy Institut, 2011). 
Germany’s main financial support policy for renewable energy is the feed-in tariff (FIT). This 
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support instrument is based on the ‘Act on Granting Priority to Renewable Energy Sources’ 
(in German: Gesetz für den Vorrang Erneuerbarer Energien, hereafter EEG). The EEG 
guarantees the basic FIT payment for a duration of 20 years from the date of a plant’s 
installation. The feed-in tariffs differ between the technologies used in order to adjust for 
differences in the costs between production techniques. Furthermore, these tariffs are 
regionally differentiated to especially support wind power installations in regions with more 
favorable wind conditions. Grid operators have to connect newly installed wind energy 
projects to the grid and must feed in all produced electricity. Any plant specific installation 
costs are borne by the plant owner or operator, while grid operators are required to provide a 
sufficient capacity of the electricity grid. This raises the question of how important policy 
support of feed-in tariffs actually is for wind energy investors’ decision making. We will 
investigate this issue in our paper. 
Several studies stress the importance of financial constraints as a barrier to renewable 
energy investment and innovation (Carreira and Silva, 2010; Hall and Lerner, 2010). Hoffman 
et al. (2014) argue that the competitive advantage from industrial ecology can accrue through 
drivers like cost savings, enhanced revenues, improved brand positioning, product 
differentiation, gains in market share, organizational know-how, ability to attract and retain 
talent, and gaining an advantageous position in an industry’s evolving structure (Hoffman et 
al., 2014, p596). This seems rather general but it reveals that access to finance or subsidies 
and tax advantages is not explicitly being recognized as a ‘value driver’ in the industrial 
ecology literature so far. In this respect, it is of interest to report that González et al. (2005) 
find that most subsidies go to firms that would have invested anyway. Furthermore, Aschhoff 
(2010) finds that firm’s size increases the probability of entering in the funding schemes. 
Huber et al. (2004) study EU support schemes and conclude that well-designed feed-in tariffs 
implemented among the EU-15 countries are the most efficient ones. Meyer (2007) observes 
that energy policies are likely to change, which is likely to induce regulatory uncertainty 
which in turn can impact both the size and timing of investments. Dinica (2006) and Mitchell 
et al. (2006) argue that financing costs play an important role in investment decisions. 
Furthermore, our study relates to the analysis of industrial ecology, specifically to studies 
trying to detect the factors that might drive the development of new industrial clusters and 
markets. In particular, we connect to the research of Andrews and DeVault (2009), Held et al. 
(2009), Moore and Wüstenhagen (2004), Lüthi and Wüstenhagen (2009), Price and Kendall 
(2012), Hoffman et al. (2014) and Dewulf et al. (2015), who suggest several factors might 
play a role, such as climate conditions, production costs, market movements related to 
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conventional energies, intangible characteristics of the investor and his/her social 
environment, and the life cycle of wind energy installations.  
Bode and Michaelowa (2003), Fleten, Maribu and Wangensteen (2007), Donovan 
and Nuñez (2012), Sadorsky (2012) and Peňa et al. (2014) specifically assess the investment 
costs for renewable energy projects. The estimations of costs and revenues suggest that profit 
maximizing investors mainly utilize the method of net present value and weighted average 
cost of capital (WACC) to assess alternative investment opportunities. Masini and Menichetti 
(2012) find that renewable energy investors prefer to commit to more mature technologies, as 
they are risk averse and evaluate opportunities over a relatively short time horizon. In 
addition, financiers perceive technology effectiveness, the political support level and its 
length as the most important factors, and they regard the level of political support still as 
inadequate, whereas the length and stability of such support is deemed important (Masini and 
Menichetti, 2012). This result is in line with that found by Moore and Wüstenhagen (2004), 
Held et al. (2009) and Lüthi and Wüstenhagen (2009) and specifies the setting of the 
industrial ecology regarding renewable energy generation. 
We also connect with the research by Enzensberger et al. (2002), who investigate the 
characteristics of stakeholders in the renewable energy industry and particularly how policy 
schemes can influence the investors. Stakeholders that are affected by policy schemes either 
directly or indirectly include non-governmental organizations, policy makers on different 
levels, in particular bankers, plant suppliers, and project investors (Agterbosch et al., 2004; 
Bergek et al., 2013). For policies to be effective, a long term vision seems highly relevant (see 
also Masini and Menichetti, 2012). And innovation and investment are only sustained if firms 
have sufficient ‘planning security’. As wind energy is capital intensive and plants are 
commonly depreciated over a time frame of ten to twenty years, secured income in the form 
of guaranteed price premiums is a crucial condition for especially small and less experienced 
entrepreneurs.  
Our paper fits in with these strands of literature on the role of financing constraints, 
investment drivers, energy policies, and investor type in relation to investments in wind 
energy capacity. The contribution of the study is that it specifically goes into the interaction 
between environmental policy and financial conditions and discusses the role of investor type. 
We investigate the sensitivity of wind energy investment for (changes in) policy support and 
we offer the perspective of differentiation along various investor types regarding the specific 
role of this support. We do so for Germany, whose feed-in tariff policy has been regarded as 
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highly successful regarding the installation of wind capacity (von Hirschhausen, 2014). Our 
prospective contribution is to establish the role of the wind energy support mechanism in 
relation to other – more conventional – investment considerations in the case of different 
types of business.  
We find that in general a change in the feed-in tariff has a negative impact on 
investment capacity in Germany: a one monetary unit increase in the variation of the tariff is 
to be associated with a decrease by 0.17 MW wind capacity installed. This suggests that 
policy uncertainty makes investors shy away from making real investments. We also argue 
that the drivers for wind energy investment can differ along different types of firms. For the 
traditional power producers, especially electricity price volatility, construction costs, and 
carbon prices seem to matter. But for the other investor types, the feed-in tariff is very 
important. These findings complement the industrial ecology analysis of Andrews and 
DeVault (2009) and Hoffman et al. (2014) as we show that different types of wind energy 
investors are driven by different factors, that alternative business models may outcompete the 
incumbents, and that finance does play a significant role too.  
 
Method and data  
 
To find an answer to the question of how important feed-in tariffs are for investment 
decisions in wind energy capacity, we rely on a conventional general investment model. The 
model includes the usual suspects from the corporate finance literature (investment risk, cost 
of capital; see Tirole, 2006), specifics about wind energy (Fleten et al., 2007; Sadorsky, 2012), 
as well as the policy support mechanism (in this case the FIT under the EEG; see also Dinica, 
2006; Mitchell et al. 2006): 
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝜎𝜎𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝜎𝜎𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  + (𝛽𝛽7 + ⋯+ 𝛽𝛽19)𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 (1) 
 
where Ci measures the newly installed capacity in month i, measured in megawatt. The main 
independent variables are the average feed-in tariff Fi to be paid over the guaranteed 
compensation period of 20 years granted through the EEG and the weighted average cost of 
capital Ri, which simulates the cost of external capital for energy investors. The investment 
risks are divided into production and market risks (Tirole, 2006), which entails the volatility 
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of the wind σWi, estimated by the change in the average wind-index for Germany Wi (Mulder 
and Scholtens, 2013), and the volatility of the market price for electricity σPi, as traded on the 
European Energy Exchange (see Fleten et al., 2007) respectively. The manufacturing costs are 
proxied by the monthly average iron and steel price index Si (see for example Tirole, 2006). 
The random error term εi includes all additional factors that might cause the amount of 
installed capacity to change, e.g. personality traits of investors, availability of land resources 
or amounts of installed wind energy plants in the near surroundings (Andrews and DeVault, 
2009; Price and Kendall, 2012; Dewulf et al., 2015).  
We hypothesize that the FIT will have a positive impact on the installed capacity, as 
a higher guaranteed price will yield the investment more productive. We expect that 
production risk, i.e. wind index volatility, is negatively related to installed capacity. More 
uncertainty about production may reduce the investors’ appetite to invest in wind capacity. 
Cost factors, i.e. the weighted average cost of capital and the index for iron and steel prices, 
are expected to be negative as well, as their increase will reduce the revenues for investment 
projects as they impact on a project’s capital expenditures as well as on its operational 
expenditures. Due to the guaranteed prices through the FIT scheme, market risks in the form 
of electricity price volatility is expected to have a positive impact. This is because increased 
price risk may drive investors towards projects where prices are guaranteed and because 
higher price volatility especially benefits those who produce at the lowest marginal costs. The 
coefficients for the monthly dummy variables are expected to have an increasingly positive 
magnitude, the more the year progresses. This captures the preference of investors to 
implement projects later in the year, before the yearly degression reduces the FIT.  
Detailed data on renewable energy technologies and their current development status 
is scarce. There is no publicly available database and we had to collect data from different 
sources for the analysis (Appendix A). Data for the variables could be obtained for a time 
frame between June 2000 and December 2013. For investments in wind energy, newly 
installed capacity of wind turbines per month was chosen as the dependent variable. Capacity 
is measured in megawatt (MW) and on a monthly basis for the country (see Hitaj et al. (2013) 
for geographical allocation analysis of wind energy capacity). Towards the second half of the 
year, newly installed capacity substantially increases. This may be explained by the 
degression aspect of the regulation, which reduces the tariff by the first of January of each 
year. As a result, investors will usually be eager to install their plants before the end of the 
year. Due to repowering activities (replacing two or three small mills with a newer wind mill 
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with larger capacity) the monthly installed amounts cannot be summed up to arrive at the 
overall wind capacity.  
The average feed-in tariff is paid over the guaranteed compensation period of 20 
years. The average FIT identifies the percentage of yearly degression of the basic 
compensation. The initial compensation is granted for only the first five years and afterwards 
it is extended on the basis of the relative performance of the windmill. On the basis of data 
from BMWi (2014), the higher initial amount is paid for 11.67 years if the wind mill performs 
around 120 per cent of its reference performance, which is the performance of an average 
location. The average feed-in tariff was calculated as follows: 
𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 = 11.67 ∗ (𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑆𝑆) + (20 − 11.67) ∗ 𝐹𝐹𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏20   
Fi average feed-in tariff 
Fin initial compensation 
S system service bonus 
Fba basic compensation 
In order to estimate the cost of capital for wind energy projects, a weighted average 
cost of capital (WACC) needs to be computed. The WACC includes both cost of debt and 
equity according to their weights in the financing of a project, while accounting for the tax 
shield. European commercial wind energy projects are usually financed with a debt-to-equity 
ratio of 80/20 (Deloitte, 2013). Chaves-Schwinteck (2010) finds that raising the share of debt 
financing increases the rate of return of a project, which justifies the low share of equity for 
wind energy products. To estimate the cost of equity for the whole wind energy industry, we 
use the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). This model describes that the return of an 
investment equals the risk free rate, which in our case is estimated by ten year government 
bonds, plus an industry beta multiplied by the market premium, which compensates investors 
for systemic risk. We follow Cleijne and Ruijgrok (2004) who suggest an industry beta of 
0.69, based on independent wind energy developing firms. Estimates for market risk 
premiums were taken from Deloitte (2013), who suggest an average risk premium of 5.5% for 
the German market. The cost of debt financing is represented by the data for a medium-term 
yield corporate bond index. These corporate bonds observe a similar risk distribution as with 
energy projects. Here, the data is taken from Bundesbank publications of the daily yields of 
corporate bonds, from which a monthly average was generated. Lastly, the corporate tax rate 
is included in the cost of capital calculation, reducing the cost of debt, as interest is tax 
deductible. Thus, the cost of capital for the regression model is calculated according to: 
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𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = 0.2 ∗ (𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 + 0.69 ∗ 5.5%) + (1 − 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗) ∗ 0.8 ∗ 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖  
Gi percentage yield of 10 year government bond in month i 
Ri percentage yield of Bundesbank corporate bond index in month i 
tj corporate tax rate in year j 
We want to stress that the results of the analysis of the project viability may be 
sensitive to the discount rate in the net present value and return on investment estimates and, 
hence, on the WACC calculation. Peňa et al. (2014) point out that discount rates are critical in 
investment decisions and, as such, the method to create the WACC is critical. They do show 
so in their analysis of the profitability of wind parks in Portugal (Peňa et al., 2014). 
Wind-index data is a measure of wind speed in a certain location or area. The 
average of wind speeds from 1996 until 2009 is set at 100. All monthly data is given as a 
percentage of the deviation from this reference value to capture production risk. The speeds 
are measured and submitted by plant operators each month and aggregated for a specific 
index per region by the consultancy firm Enveco GmbH. In order to retrieve the volatility of 
wind for the analysis, the monthly change of the aforementioned percentage of deviation was 
calculated and used in the regression model.  
Despite the guaranteed fixed payment to wind energy owners via the FIT, market 
prices also may influence the investment decision as it relates to the opportunity costs of 
energy producers. Furthermore, the share of owners that sell the generated electricity directly 
to the electricity market has increased in recent years and policies have attempted to 
strengthen this development further (Hitaj et al., 2013). The direct sale on the electricity 
market makes wind electricity more competitive. We use the German price for electricity on 
the European Energy Exchange as an estimate for such market volatility. Daily data of the 
PHELIX Base rate is readily available and was transformed into a monthly variable by 
calculating the monthly standard deviation. Similar to the data of newly installed capacity, the 
electricity prices are subject to seasonal fluctuations. Another cost factor is the initial 
construction costs for the wind plants. About 50 per cent of these costs are for raw materials, 
which are heavily influenced by the steel and copper prices (Kitzing and Weber, 2014). 
Therefore, the monthly average of the Dow Jones Iron and Steel price index for Germany was 
chosen as our proxy for manufacturing costs.  
We provide descriptive statistics in Table 1 and Table 2. Table 1 displays the 
summary statistics of our variables. In Appendix B-D, we graph the costs of capital, FIT, 
wind volatility, and electricity price volatility. To investigate whether our data suit the 
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estimation method, we had to perform various tests. We first tested the data for stationarity 
before we conduct the regression analysis. We use the combination of variables that are 
integrated of order zero (capacity, wind volatility, electricity price volatility) and of order one 
(FIT, cost of capital, steel price) in the regression model, which as a whole is stationary. For 
the estimations, the raw data are normalized to allow for comparison and to avoid that 
dimensioning would impact on the results. Table 2 shows the correlation coefficients of the 
main variables. It turns out that these are very low. 
[Insert Table 1 and 2 about here] 
Data limitations include mainly the lack of a unified source for the average feed-in 
tariff. Additionally, test statistics might be influenced by the seasonal patterns of some 
variables and the break in the series for the FIT, when it was raised by more than one 
cent/kWh through the implementation of the EEG 2009. The investment model described 
above was estimated by means of a straightforward multiple regression model and takes the 
following form after the stationarity amendments:  
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2∆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3∆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝜎𝜎𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5𝜎𝜎𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6∆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + (𝛽𝛽7 + ⋯+ 𝛽𝛽19)𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖             (2) 
Thus, compared to equation (1), it shows we cannot include the level of FIT, cost of 
capital, and steel prices in the regression model because of the nonstationarity problem. Hence, 
we have to provide additional hypotheses regarding the changes in these variables. In this 
respect, we hypothesize that the coefficient for the changes in the FIT is negative as it affects 
the ‘rules of the game’ and as such negatively impacts investor confidence and, hence, could 
have a negative impact on wind capacity investments (Enzensberger, 2002; Madlener et al., 
2005; Dinica, 2006; Fleten et al., 2007; Carreira and Silva, 2010; Hall and Lerner, 2010). The 
same reasoning holds for changes in the cost of capital and in those of steel, which are used as 
a proxy for manufacturing costs.  
 
Results 
 
The aim of this study is to investigate the impact of the feed-in tariff policy on 
investment decisions in wind energy projects in Germany alongside other determinants of 
wind energy capacity. We estimated the model for all investors at once as well as for the ‘Big 
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Four’. Due to lack of data, we could not do so for the other investor types. Table 3 shows the 
overall result for the estimation and also depicts the results for the incumbents. In all 
significance tests, we allow for the 95% level of significance. After a discussion of the results, 
we will also go into the potential role of the FIT policy for wind energy investments for the 
other types of investors, namely the small private investors, diversified companies, and 
independent power producers. Please note that the discussion regarding the latter can be of a 
qualitative nature only due to lack of detailed information.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Table 3 reveals that the volatility of the electricity prices is not statistically 
significant. Wind volatility which also happens to be statistically non-significant in the 
estimation of the model. However, the changes in the FIT do show to have an impact that is 
both material from an economic point of view and which are statistically significant. It 
appears that these changes do have a negative impact on installed capacity. More specifically, 
we find that a change in the feed-in tariff has a negative impact on investment capacity: a one 
monetary unit increase in the variation of the tariff is to be associated with a decrease by 0.17 
MW wind capacity installed. This is in line with findings elsewhere in the empirical literature 
that suggest that investors shy away from changes in policies, even if they are beneficial 
(Meyer, 2007; Campiglio, 2014). Cost of capital is not statistically significant. Changes in 
construction costs, as depicted by steel prices, do only have a marginally statistically 
significant and negative impact. Hence, we conclude that we can confirm our hypotheses 
regarding the impact of changes in policy support and manufacturing costs. We do not find 
support for the hypotheses regarding investment risk and costs of capital though. Next, we 
turn to focus on how the model performs for one particular group of investors, namely the 
‘Big Four’. 
 
Big Four 
The ‘Big Four’ consists of the four main electricity distributors in Germany, namely 
RWE, E.ON, EnBW and Vattenfall (see Kungl, 2014). Together they provide around 42 per 
cent of German households with electricity. In the renewable electricity market they play a 
minor role, with only around five per cent ownership of all production plants. Of 30,000MW 
installed capacity in Germany, the ‘Big Four’ own 1,290MW of onshore wind energy. Being 
the only group that is able to utilize sufficient capital internally, the main decision for utility-
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scale firms is whether to retain commitment to fossil fuels or to change towards more 
renewable energy production (Backer, 2009). Due to data limitations, we had to make some 
amendments and additional assumptions in order to arrive at estimation results for the ‘Big 
Four’ with respect to model (2). Most important is the inclusion of CO2 emission trading to 
which these companies are subject. We hypothesize that higher carbon prices will make wind 
energy investment relatively more appealing to the conventional power companies. As CO2 
emission trading data and interest rates were only available for a limited timeframe, the model 
is estimated for the period between June 2010 and June 2012. Furthermore, for practical 
purposes, we assume that the incumbents owned five percent of overall wind capacity 
throughout. Therefore, the four firms’ share of the newly installed capacity was calculated by 
using the data mentioned before, retrieved from Fraunhofer IWES, and multiplying the values 
with a factor of 0.05. The assumption made is that the utility-scale firms have the same timely 
planning preferences as other investor groups, which showed strong seasonal fluctuation. 
Weighted average cost of capital is calculated using different proxy values for the industry 
beta and the cost of debt financing. As an estimate for utility-scale firms’ cost of debt capital, 
we used an interest rate for corporations, published by the Bundesbank. Whereas smaller 
companies do not have the resources and expertise to engage in carbon trading, this can be a 
source of competitive advantage for the utility firms (Söderholm and Klaassen, 2007; 
Söderholm et al. 2007). Hence, this variable is included for the ‘Big Four’ in the estimation of 
the investment model. As with the basic analysis, we need to account for stationarity with the 
result that we had to include changes in carbon prices instead of the levels. We do hypothesize 
that uncertainty regarding these prices, as reflected in changes, will induce the incumbents to 
increase their investments in wind energy capacity for the similar reasons as discussed above: 
It will make them wary to invest in their traditional business and they may find it worthwhile 
to ‘hedge’ by building up wind capacity. 
The results are provided in Table 3, under ‘Big Four’. Firstly, the model is overall 
statistically significant and 72 per cent of all variations in the data can be explained by the 
model. It shows that electricity price volatility is just marginally statistically significant (95% 
significance level) for the conventional electricity producers, as are the changes in steel prices. 
Very interesting is that the carbon price changes also are statistically significant. A change of 
carbon prices by one Euro will increase wind capacity installed by the ‘Big Four’ by 0.4 MW 
Furthermore, changes in steel prices turn out to be (marginally) significant. The three other 
factors are not statistically significant. The seasonal effects were captured by dummies and 
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happen to show a statistically significant impact of the first and last quarter (not reported in 
the table).  
 
Small private investors 
Small private investors include private individuals and agricultural entrepreneurs 
who use their own land for the construction of wind energy plants. Small scale investors with 
limited individual financial capability have become the main drivers of the German energy 
transition. According to the Agency for Renewable Energy, 47 per cent of all installed 
renewable electricity capacity in 2012 was in the hands of private investors (35%) or farmers 
(11%). For wind energy, the ownership and actual electricity production may even be higher, 
at around 50 per cent. In 2012, individual farmers invested €18.2 billion into renewable 
electricity plants, six per cent of this amount into wind energy plants (Agency for Renewable 
Energy, 2012). Electricity production is a source of supplementary income and investment 
decisions might be restrained by the choice between expanding core business activities and 
the engagement in wind energy production. Due to limited availability of equity and their 
dependence on external financing, they probably are more risk averse than other investor 
groups. According to Bode and Michaelowa (2003), individual investors attribute a 
considerable importance to the internal rate of return in their comparison of project 
alternatives. Individuals will choose the project with the highest internal rate of return. Other 
evaluation criteria include cost of risk and financing (Kahn, 1996) and expected revenues 
(Muñoz et al., 2009). Risk aversion and a desire for long term planning security indicate the 
need for long term policy and price guarantees. Additionally, other concerns such as those of 
farmers in particular, include in the long term management of natural resources and 
preservation of traditional family values which gives individual investors a far less profit 
driven motivation, but rather a more idealistic reason to support renewable energies (Bergek 
et al. 2013; Williams and Schaefer, 2013).  
Diversified Companies 
The core business of these non-specialized commercial players is outside the 
production of electricity. Often, medium or large scale firms which possess own resources of 
land and seek means to improve energy efficiency or reduce costs decide to enter the RE 
industry. Large agricultural cooperatives may be included in this group due to the substantial 
scale of their investment. Just like individual investors, diversifying companies face capital 
resource constraints and need to rely on external financing sources. In Germany, these 
strategic investors have significant ownership of renewable electricity plants. Companies that 
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expand into the business of renewable electricity production are limited by the choice between 
investing in production factors that might increase profitability of core business activities and 
the commitment to renewable electricity. Renewable electricity has certain advantages such as 
a guaranteed stream of income and the potential to use it for own production processes. Big 
electricity consuming companies, such as in the manufacturing industries, pay a lower 
electricity price in Germany. Investing in (own) renewable energy plants therefore might 
prove beneficial for medium-sized companies which are not eligible regarding these subsidies. 
However, due to the lack of experience in the energy market, these companies could also face 
inefficiencies that give rise to additional costs. Enzensberger et al. (2002) finds that 
diversified companies are as risk averse as private investors because they face similar 
information, experience and finance related constraints. One important difference however, 
lies in the amount of intrinsic motivation of the companies. This is assumed to be lower than 
that of individual investors, and could even result from external pressures, similar to the case 
of the ‘Big Four’. Some companies might incorporate the idea of sustainability in their 
business values and firm strategies; others however, simply see a revenue and profit raising 
opportunity or even as a marketing ploy. True investment objectives will be very difficult to 
observe. As investment drivers are usually related to profit maximization considerations, 
Bergek et al. (2013) identify operational costs and political risks as the main investment 
decision factors.  
Independent Power Producers 
Independent power producers are smaller project developing firms that focus their 
core business activities on renewable energy investment. Their development started in the 
1990s and varies from small project developers with only a dozen employees to larger firms 
with around 100 employees. The specific knowledge about the renewable energy business 
gives them a certain competitive advantage, which makes them a group of enormous 
importance for the German renewable energy development. With about 14 per cent ownership 
of all renewable energy plants they possess a large amount of economic power in the green 
energy industry. As electricity production is their only source of income and large amount of 
capital and employees depend on the profitability of realized projects, planning security is of 
huge importance. Enzensberger et al. (2002) acknowledge a high risk that is due to the lack of 
a security net in form of revenues from other operations; however, he also mentions the 
advantages of being more specialized. Project developers can mitigate risks due to their 
higher efficiency and better knowledge of the industry more effectively than other investor 
groups and are therefore able to invest more profitable. In order to be considered attractive, a 
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project usually is required to observe sufficiently high returns as these independent power 
producers face fixed costs that cannot be covered by profits from other operations, as is the 
case for investors that diversify their assets by investing in wind energy. They therefore 
conclude that intrinsic motivation of independent power producers is high, as they must 
constantly enlarge and diversify their portfolio. Furthermore, most of these firms were 
founded due to idealistic reasons and because entrepreneurs support the renewable energy 
development. Donovan and Nuñez (2012) identify the return on investment as a main decision 
variable for renewable energy firms. Additionally, market conditions such as grid capacity 
and demand projections are of crucial importance and can therefore influence the timing of 
the investment decision (Madlener et al. 2005). As project developers face constraints in 
terms of available resources, both capital and land, investments might be made only to secure 
resources from competing investors. The key decision making factor is the specialized 
experience this investor group brings into the market. Although their energy market 
experience might be limited, most entrepreneurs most likely possess a long history of business 
management in general.  
Comparison 
Table 4 summarizes the investment decision, resource constraints and motivational 
aspects of the four investor groups. Independent power producers have to account for external 
factors more than others, as they have to work with entirely external resources and have no 
additional business activities to dampen profit losses. Diversified companies and individual 
investors actually face similar constraints and characteristics, as they must both decide 
between producing their own electricity (and investing in capacity) and purchasing it on the 
market. While they have to source capital externally, this group often possesses their own 
land resources where plants can be installed. The main difference ultimately lies in the 
motivation for undertaking the investment, which is assumed to be higher for small scale 
investors and farmers in particular. However, due to the financing costs these investors face, 
policy support is more important for them than for diversified companies. Lastly, as already 
discussed above, the ‘Big Four’ decide whether to invest in renewable energy capacity or in 
conventional power plants. They are the group which is most affluent and can often source 
capital internally. Furthermore, they are highly influential in politics. Nevertheless, they must 
also compete for the most profitable locations and cost efficiency is a crucial issue, and their 
intrinsic idealistic motivation seems low to begin with.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
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Conclusion 
We investigate the drivers of wind energy investment for different types of firms in 
Germany. We find that financial support still plays an important role in the decision to invest 
in wind energy projects, although not for the incumbent power companies. Despite wind 
energy’s mature technology and increasing ability to compete with conventionally produced 
electricity, the German feed-in tariff provides stability regarding the cash flows that is 
especially important for small-scale investors. 
Treating all wind energy investors as a homogenous group yields the result that the 
changes in the FIT and construction costs turn out to be statistically significant. Running the 
model for the ‘Big Four’ power producers shows that changes in electricity price volatility, 
construction costs, and carbon prices do so. The Big Four’s investments in wind capacity are 
not statistically significantly affected by changes in feed-in tariffs. It seems somewhat 
surprising that the weighted average cost of capital has not a significant impact on newly 
installed capacity. We assume this might reflect the role of public support and investors’ 
intrinsic motivation. We analysed three other investor groups (small private investors, 
diversified companies, independent producers) on the basis of the literature and we made a 
qualitative comparison regarding the impact of (changes in) feed-in tariffs. We argue that 
regulatory changes especially impact independent power producers, as this group’s existence 
depends on the success of the renewable energy projects they execute. Small-scale investors 
are expected to be affected less, as they have sufficient intrinsic motivation to execute projects 
also under a lower compensation by the state.  
We need to point out some limitations of our approach. Several variables need 
further specification in order to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion regarding the exact 
determinants for the different types of firm and the implications for policy makers and 
practitioners. Further, the analysis cannot be used to arrive at making predictions as we could 
not include expectations in the model. A drawback is the lack of a consistent database that 
offers information about financial variables, ownership structure and capacities of wind 
energy projects. This will require the construction of consistent databases regarding the 
development of different types of renewable energy with various firm types. Future research 
on the topic might combine quantitative and qualitative findings of different investors’ 
15 
 
decision-making processes and therefore contribute to the improvement of an efficient policy 
support scheme.  
Our study complements the existing literature. More specifically, we show how the 
German FIT policy actually impacts wind energy capacity and this contributes to previous 
studies such as Huber et al. (2004), Meyer (2007), Hitaj et al. (2013). We specify the role of 
finance in relation to wind energy policy and this illustrates the case for wind energy, which 
complements the studies of Carreira and Silva (2010), Hall and Lerner (2010), Peňa et al. 
(2014). We also find that there is a role for finance and costs in the shaping of industrial 
ecology and as such we complement the views by Hoffman et al. (2014). We triangulate the 
FIT policy, finance and wind energy investment and as such link up with the work of Dinica 
(2006) and Mitchell et al. (2006). Lastly, we provide empirical illustration of the different role 
of investment drivers in the industrial ecology (Andrews and DeVault, 2009) by accounting 
for the type of organization (Bergek et al., 2013). 
As a policy implication, we infer that policy makers should continue to focus on 
reducing risks for all investor types, especially by being transparent and consistent. The 
research has shown that the actual amount of the tariff does not have as much of an impact as 
might have been expected. Additionally, policies should focus on improving market 
conditions for renewable sources for electricity production and establishing a liberal 
electricity market where market entry is free and where different technologies are able to 
compete fairly, i.e. at a level playing field.  
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Appendices  
 
Appendix A - Data sources 
Newly installed capacity:  
Windmonitor Fraunhofer Institut für Windenergie und Energiesystemtechnik (2014) Monthly 
Installations of Wind Turbines. Retrieved via www.windmonitor.iwes.fraunhofer.de 
[Accessed on 6th May 2014]  
 
Average feed-in tariff:  
Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety 
(2014) Acts and Ordinances: Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG) 2000, 2002, 2004, 2009 
and 2012, retrieved via www.erneuerbare-energien.de [Accessed on 6th May 2014] 
 
Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Building and Nuclear Safety 
(2014) Acts and Ordinances: Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG) – Tariffs and sample 
degression rates, retrieved via www.erneuerbare-energien.de [Accessed on 6th May 2014] 
 
Weighted average cost of capital: 
Bundesbank Corporate Bond Yields 2000-2014. retrieved via Datastream [Accessed on 30th 
April 2014] 
 
Corporate Tax Rates 2000-2006: KPMG (2006) KPMG’s Corporate Tax Rate Survey. 
Retrieved via http://www.lib.uwo.ca/files/business/KPMGCorporateTaxRateSurvey.pdf 
[Accessed on 20th May 2014] 
 
Corporate Tax Rates 2006-2012: KPMG (2014) Corporate tax rates table. Retrieved via 
http://www.kpmg.com/global/en/services/tax/tax-tools-and-resources/pages/corporate-tax-
rates-table.aspx [Accessed on 20th May 2014] 
 
Industry Beta: Cleijne, H. and Ruijgrok, W. (2004) Modelling Risks of renewable energy 
investments. Report of the project “Deriving Optimal Promotion Strategies for Increasing the 
Share of RES-E in a Dynamic European Electricity Market”. Retrieved via http://www.green-
x.at/downloads/WP2%20-%20Modelling%20risks%20of%20renewable%20energy%20 
investments%20(Green-X).pdf [Accessed on 20th May 2014] 
 
Market Risk: Deloitte (2013) Overview of business parameters in energy industry. Retrieved 
via http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-Italy/Local%20Assets/Documents/Pubblicazioni/ 
survey%20panel%20energy_ENG_bassa.pdf [Accessed on 20th May 2014] 
 
Interest Rates: Bundesbank (2014) Time series BBK01.SUD179: Effective interest rates of 
German banks / New business / Loans to non-financial corporations over EUR 1 million with 
collateral and/or guarantees, initial rate fixation of over 10 years. Retrieved via: 
http://www.bundesbank.de/Navigation/EN/Statistics/Time_series_databases/Macro_economic
22 
 
_time_series/its_details_value_node.html?listId=www_s11b_unt5b&tsId=BBK01.SUD179 
[Accessed on 20th May 2014] 
 
10-year government bonds Germany 2010-2012. retrieved via Datastream [Accessed on 30th 
April 2014] 
 
Volatility of wind-index: 
BDB Wind-Index 2000-2014 received from Enveco GmbH (Tanja.utner@enveco.de) 
 
Volatility of electricity price:  
PHELIX Base 0-24h on European Energy Exchange 2000-2014. retrieved via Datastream 
[Accessed on 30th April 2014] 
 
Iron and steel price index: 
Dow Jones Iron & Steel Index 2000-2014. Retrieved via Datastream [Accessed on 20th May 
2014] 
 
DAX Utilities Index: 
DAX Utilities (XETRA) – Price Index retrieved via Datastream [Accessed on 30th April 2014] 
 
CO2 Emission Prices: 
EEX-EU CO2 Emissions on European Energy Exchange 2010-2012. retrieved via Datastream 
[Accessed on 30th April 2014] 
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Appendix B  
Development of Feed-In Tariff (in ct/kWh) and weighted average costs of capital (in 
percentage) in the period January 2000 – December 2013  
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Appendix C  
Wind volatility (in percentage) 
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Appendix D  
Electricity price volatility (in percentage) 
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Variable 
 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dickey-F.  
Test Prob. 
New capacity Ci  MW 163 180.10 99.561 46.35 559.49 0.00 
Average FIT Fi ct/kWh 163 7.4647 0.3316 6.80 7.85 0.38 
∆Average FIT  ∆Fi ct/kWh 162 -0.0027 0.0824 -0.25 0.95 0.00 
Capital Cost % 163 3.9202 0.6652 2.64 5.82 0.63 
∆Capital Cost ∆Ri  % 162 -0.0068 0.1588 -0.59 0.63 0.00 
Wind-Index volatility σWi % 163 0.0735 0.3971 -0.64 1.76 0.00 
PHELIX volatility σPi % 163 0.2279 0.2260 -0.07 2.06 0.00 
Steel Price Index € 163 236.95 127.89 81.86 683.19 0.57 
∆Steel Price Index ∆Si € 162 -0.2298 29.724 -150.88 86.89 0.00 
Table 1: Summary statistics and stationarity test outcomes 
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Ci 
newly installed 
capacity in 
month i 
∆Fi 
change 
in the average 
feed-in tariff 
∆Ri 
change 
in the weighted 
average cost of 
capital 
𝜎𝜎𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 
volatility 
in wind 
production 
σPi 
electricity 
price volatility 
∆𝑆𝑆 
change in 
the steel 
price index 
 Ci 
1     
 
∆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖  0.0582 1     
∆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖  0.0156 -0.0901 1    
𝜎𝜎𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 0.1618 -0.0464 0.0540 1   
𝜎𝜎𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 0.1030 -0.0449 0.0414 -0.1133 1  
∆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 0.0915 -0.0166 -0.0223 -0.0739 0.0459 1 
Table 2: Correlation matrix   
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 Overall sample 
 
‘ Big Four’ 
 Coefficient Probability 
value 
 
Coefficient Probability 
value 
Change in FIT  -0.17 0.035** 0.219 0.253 
Change in cost 
of capital  
-0.07 0.754 0.002 0.299 
Wind volatility  -0.85 0.525 0.112 0.273 
Electricity price 
volatility  
8.31 0.128 2.438 0.090* 
Change in steel 
price index 
-.07 0.063* -0.163 0.096* 
Change in 
carbon prices  
- - 0.397 0.002*** 
Constant 2.04 0.000*** 7.60 0.001*** 
     
R2  0.58  0.73 
F-value  9.13  4.38 
Prob. (F)  0.000***  0.007*** 
Obs.   161  24 
Table 3: Estimated relationship between wind energy capacity in Germany and 
potential determinants. 
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Investor Group Investment Decision 
Resources 
Intrinsic Motivation 
Financial Land 
Independent power 
producers  
Competition for most 
profitable locations external external 
High, 
Environmentalism & 
profit maximization 
Small private 
investors / farmers 
Buy or Make & investing 
in production factors external internal 
Very high,  
Intrinsic motivation 
for environmentalism 
Diversified 
companies 
Buy or Make & investing 
in production factors external 
Internal/ 
external 
Medium,  
Energy efficiency, 
cost reduction 
Power companies 
(The ‘Big Four’) 
Between conventional 
and renewable plant internal external 
Low, 
Shareholder interest, 
regulations 
Table 4: Firm type and renewable energy investment decision making 
 
